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1 Introduction
The interplay of corporate and personal income taxes lies at the heart of tax policy
design. As entrepreneurs face a choice between corporate and non-corporate forms of
doing business, any divergence between rates of corporate and personal tax creates
incentives to shift taxable income from the higher to the lower taxed organizational
form. A careful study of the impact of taxes on incorporation helps us to understand
the implications of income tax on the organization and location of real economic
activities, which is an essential step toward the designing of e¢ cient tax policy.
Existing empirical evidence based on a small number of studies, including Gordon
and MacKie-Mason (1994), Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), Gordon and Slemrod
(2000) and Goolsbee (1998, 2004), suggests a small but signicant e¤ect of taxes on
incorporation decisions of U.S. rms. Most of these studies (with the exception of
Goolsbee (2004)) rely on time-series data, where identication of the tax e¤ects is
limited by the small variation in statutory tax rates.
In this paper I overcome the problem of limited variation by turning to the early
period of income taxation. The rst two decades of the twentieth century witnessed
tremendous changes in the income tax regimes in the United States. At the federal
level, corporate income tax was introduced in 1909 and personal income tax in 1913.
Marginal rates in the schedules of both taxes moved frequently and dramatically
during this period. The top marginal corporate rate was 1 percent in 1909; by 1919
it had risen to 10 percent. The personal income tax schedule dened 7 income
brackets in 1913, with the marginal rate ranging from 1 percent to 7 percent. By
1919, the number of tax brackets had increased to 56 and the marginal rate spanned
from 4 percent to 73 percent. The rst World War caused major shift in the scope
and structure of income taxation, introducing additional variation in the relative
taxation of corporate income. Furthermore, during these years (1909-1919) many
states enacted modern income tax legislations for the rst time, with considerable
di¤erences in tax structure across individual states. As a result, there are rich time-
series and cross-sectional variations in the tax rates that contributed to this studys
identication of the tax e¤ects on business incorporation.
There are some other advantages to focussing on this early period of income tax-
ation. The data on organizational forms are free of measurement errors caused by
the kinds of hybrid entities that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.
There is no need to control for the various state regulations that were implemented to
curb aggressive state-tax avoidance behavior of the corporations, which were devel-
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oped at a much later stage. Therefore, this period o¤ers a context relatively clear of
complications for the purpose of this study. On the other hand, while the economic
history literature has carefully analyzed the role of government regulation, legal sys-
tem, and the innate limitation of corporate form in business incorporation during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the contribution of income taxes in the
spread of corporate form in this period has not yet been systematically studied. (Im-
portant studies of corporate forms in this period include but not limited to Lamoreaux
and Rosenthal (2005), Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2006), and Timothy Guinnane and
Rosenthal (2007).)
The dataset I construct for the purpose of this study contains details of the ef-
fective corporate and personal tax rates for the 48 continental states of the U.S.
over the years of 1904, 1909, 1914 and 1919.1 I analyze three di¤erent indicators
of corporate activities including the corporate share of establishment, employment
and production in the manufacturing sector. Conceivably, if only the very small
enterprises respond to tax incentives by switching between the corporate and non-
corporate form, income taxes may only a¤ect the corporate share of establishment
without changing the share of employment or production. Analysis based on these
three di¤erent measures of corporate activities o¤ers a more comprehensive picture
of the relation between tax incentives and rmsreal economic activities in the econ-
omy. Controlling for macro-economic e¤ects and unobserved state heterogeneity, the
two-way xed-e¤ect estimation results suggest that the larger the di¤erence between
corporate and personal tax rates, the greater the decrease in the corporate share of
establishment, employment, and production in the manufacturing sector. Firms that
respond to incorporation incentives are, in general, larger than the average rm but
slightly smaller than existing corporations in the economy.
In a period of frequent and rapid tax changes, state governments may increase
the tax rates in response to an expanding tax base. As a result, the OLS estimates
can be either upward or downward biased. I check the robustness of my ndings
by addressing the potential reverse causality. Conclusions based on the IV estimates
remain qualitatively the same while the magnitude of IV estimates is much larger than
the OLS results. An increase of one percentage point in the tax cost to incorporate
decreases the corporate share of establishment by 1.10 percentage points, employment
by 1.79 percentage points, and the value of production by 1.57 percentage points.
The size of these tax-cost elasticities is comparable to the largest existing estimates
1The year 1919 is the last time when establishment characteristics by organizational form and
state was published by the Census of Manufacturers.
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of responsiveness as in Goolsbee (2004), although he studies the responsiveness of
rms in a much more mobile sector (the retail trade sector) and uses more recent and
condential data (special tabulation of 1992 Census of Retail Trade data).
At a given tax cost of incorporation, a one percentage point increase in the per-
sonal tax rate further increases the corporate share of establishment by 1.31 percent-
age points, employment by 2.37 percentage points, and production by 2.20 percentage
points. The fact that personal tax coe¢ cient remains signicant when its impact on
the relative taxation of corporate income is properly controlled for suggests that per-
sonal taxes may a¤ect incorporation rates through additional channels. For example,
a higher personal income tax may induce tax evasion of non-corporate rm owners,
decreasing the reported number of unincorporated rms in the sample. Alternatively,
the progressive nature of the personal tax schedule can discourage risk taking in the
pass-through entities. As a result, entrepreneurs may opt to incorporate rather than
develop a non-corporate rm.
The empirical ndings remain robust to a wide variety of specications and checks.
Using alternative instruments, weighting observations by the size of manufacturing
sector, and allowing for the possibility that marginal investors may face di¤erent tax
rates all have little e¤ect on the basic conclusions. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the rst paper that exploits the rich variation in the early period of income
taxation in order to analyze the joint role of corporate and personal income taxes in
the choice of organizational forms. This is also one of the few studies that directly
address the endogeneity of income taxes in studying the incentive e¤ect of taxes on
incorporation.
The analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on incorporation. Section 3 uses a simple discrete choice model to illustrate how
taxes may a¤ect rmschoice of organizational form. Section 4 discusses the nature
of federal and state income taxes in the rst two decades of the twentieth century.
Section 5 summarizes the data used and presents some descriptive evidence on the
e¤ect of tax cost to incorporate. Section 6 reports the basic within-group regression
results as well as ndings based on IV estimation strategy. Section 7 provides some
further robustness checks and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Previous research
2.1 Taxes and rmsorganizational forms
Existing empirical evidence suggests that tax plays an important role in the choice of
organizational forms in the United States, although no consensus has been reached
about the magnitude of the tax e¤ects. By estimating the size of the non-tax benets
of incorporation which would be consistent with the observed incorporation rates,
Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) conclude that non-tax factors appear to be dom-
inant in the choice of organizational form. Non-corporate rms are concentrated in
industries with low non-tax costs, which they interpret as indirect evidence of very
limited responsiveness to taxes regarding incorporation decisions. Mackie-Mason and
Gordon (1997) further studies the time-series behavior of asset allocation between
corporate and non-corporate rms during 1959-1986 and nds that double taxation
of corporate income discourages incorporating. Protable rms move out of the cor-
porate sector when the tax distortion is large, although the tax e¤ect is relatively
small: cutting the tax rate on non-corporate income by 10 percentage points causes
0.2 percent of total assets to shift out of corporate form.
One explanation for the small estimated tax e¤ect is that changes in the statutory
tax rates, both corporate and personal, have been negligible over the sample period
in these studies. To overcome the limited time variation in the federal tax rates,
Goolsbee (2004) turns to the cross-state di¤erence in the 1992 tax rates. He nds
the relative taxation of corporate to personal income has a signicant impact on the
corporate share of real economic activity in the retail trade sector. On average, a
10 percentage point increase in corporate income tax reduces the corporate share of
economic activity by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points This is, ve to ten times larger than
the largest measure of responsiveness found in previous time-series studies.
The non-US evidence, on the other hand, shows that corporate tax systems have
a much larger impact on the choice of organizational forms. de Mooij and Nicodeme
(2008) exploits di¤erences in the corporate and personal tax system among European
countries and shows that lower corporate taxes have a signicant and large e¤ect
on incorporation. Specically, it nds that a reduction in the corporate tax rate
equivalent to one euro only reduces the corporate tax revenue by 82 cents. Therefore,
around 10 to17 percent of corporate tax revenue can be attributed to income shifting
through incorporation.
Egger, Keuschnigg and Winner (2009) models and estimates the determinants of
incorporation including taxation. Its empirical results conrm that a higher personal
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income tax rate favors incorporation, while a higher corporate tax rate reduces the
probability that a European manufacturing rm will incorporate. Overall, an increase
in the e¤ective shareholder corporate tax burden by one standard deviation implies
a decline of the probability to incorporate of 1.4 percentage points. Freedman and
Crawford (2010) specically considers the e¤ect of taxes on the incorporation decisions
of small businesses in the United Kingdom. It presents some clear graphical evidence
that incorporation rates of small businesses have surged in subsequent years, following
the introduction of a lower corporate tax rate for companies with prots of £ 10,000
or less in 2000.2
Marco Da Rin and Sembenelli (2011) examines the e¤ect of corporate taxation
on rms incorporation decision by analyzing tax-induced changes in the number of
new companies in 17 European countries. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
only other existing paper that directly addresses the possible endogeneity of taxation
using instruments drawn from political economy literature. The authors nd a signif-
icant negative e¤ect of corporation income taxation on the entry rate of corporations
although the impact of corporation (and personal) taxation on entry rates of unin-
corporated rms is left out of the analysis. Therefore their study provides at most a
partial answer to the impact of income taxes on rms choice of organizational form.
2.2 Taxes and the location of rms
This paper is also related to a handful of studies that consider the e¤ect of state
taxation on the location of economic activities.3 Hines (1996) examines the e¤ect of
state tax rates on the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United
States and nds that state tax rates signicantly inuence the location of inbound
FDI. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) uses panel data for the U.S. states from 1978-
1994 and explore the externalities that one states apportionment formula may have
on other states. It nds that while the payroll factor weighting in the apportionment
formula inuences employment, the income tax rate has no signicant impact on the
size of a statesemployment rates in manufacturing. On the other hand, as established
in the earlier literature (see, for example, McLure (1981), Mieszkowski and Zodrow
2The starting rate of the corporation tax was initially set at 10 percent, further reduced to 0
percent in 2002/03, and nally removed in 2006/07, when the UK government recognized that the
tax incentive was a¤ecting self-employed individuals, causing them to incorporate for tax reasons
rather than because of entrepreneurship or real growth (Freedman and Crawford, 2010).
3There is, however, a large literature on the impact of corporate taxation on the location of
capital, rms and prot at the national level. Devereux (2007) provides an excellent review of recent
empirical evidence on this matter.
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(1985), and Gordon and Wilson (1986)), variation in both apportionment formulas
and statutory tax rates should at least a¤ect location decisions for employment.
The mobility dimension of the analysis is closest to Feld and Kirchgassner (2003).
This study considers the roles that the corporate and the personal income tax burden
play in the location and employment of rms in Swiss cantons, but does not dis-
tinguish rms by organizational forms. It nds that corporate and personal income
taxes contribute signicantly to the rationale for the regional distribution of rms
and of regional di¤erence in employment in Switzerland.
2.3 The incentive e¤ect of taxes in historical context
Goolsbee (1998) is the only other paper I am aware of that utilizes the rich variation
in U.S. federal tax rates during the early period of income taxation. He estimates the
impact of taxes on the non-corporate share of capital using aggregate time-series data
in 1900-1939. The empirical results suggest that taxes do matter for organizational
form decisions but the magnitude of the e¤ect is small. A ten percentage point
increase in the corporate tax rate raises the non-corporate share of capital between
0.2 and 3 percentage points.
Romer and Romer (2011) focuses on the later inter-war period and considers the
responsiveness of reported taxable income to changes in marginal personal rates. It
nds an elasticity of income with respect to the change in the log after-tax share of
0.2. It also presents some evidence that large swings in marginal personal tax rates
have inuenced the number of business incorporations in the inter-war era.
3 Theoretical framework
I start by using a simple model to illustrate how rms make decisions about whether
to incorporate based on comparison of the prots they are likely to obtain from each
organizational form. The framework is based on the stylized model developed in
Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), Goolsbee (2004), and de Mooij and Nicodeme
(2008). First lets consider the impact of taxation on rms organizational form only.
The taxation of rms di¤ers by organizational form. An entrepreneur organizing a
non-corporate rm in state i earns gross income I igross;p and is taxed at the ordinary
personal income rate  ip. The entrepreneur can also organize as a corporation with
gross income
 
I igorss;c

taxed both at the rm and person level, and the after-tax net
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income (I ic) is
I ic = (1   ic)(1   ie)I igross;c;
where  ic is the corporate tax rate in state i, and 
i
e is the tax rate on equity income.
From the usual assumption that rms maximize their prots subject to certain
constraints, each rm chooses its organizational form with a higher prot, i.e. I =
max
 
I ip; I
i
c

: In particular, a rm will incorporate if the net corporate prot is higher
than the net non-corporate prot in state i,
(1   ic)(1   ie)I igross;c > (1   ip)I igross;p: (1)
Approximating I igross;c to be proportional to I
i
gross;p by (1 +G
i
c), where G
i
c represents
the non-tax cost and benet associated with incorporation in state i;we get
I igross;c = (1 +G
i
c)I
i
gross;p: (2)
Combining equations (A1)-(A3), a rm will choose to incorporate in its current state
if
(1 +Gic) >
(1   ip)
(1   ic)(1   ie)
; (3)
Ex ante, it is unclear what the sign of Gic is. Compared to a non-corporate form, a
corporation entails benets as well as costs. As a legal entity independent of the iden-
tity of their shareholders, business corporations solve a key weakness of the partner-
ship form: the likelihood that otherwise protable enterprises would su¤er untimely
dissolution (Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2005).4 But to the extent that corporation
concentrates power in a small number of managers in the rm, problems of delegated
management and minority oppression naturally arise in accordance with the choice
of particular corporate form.5
Another key advantage of incorporation is that it allows rms to raise external
funds on the equity markets. Corporations also benet from limited liability, although
in order to gain access to credit, studies show that most corporations depended on
their stockholders personally to endorse their debts in this period, which imposed
costs that could a¤ect the rms access to credit and its exibility to make decisions
4The U.S. legal system didnt grant partnership limited liability until the Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act in 1992.
5A large literature on corporate governance directly addresses this issue: for example, see Demsetz
and Lehn (1985), Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Roell (1998), and Tirole (2001).
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(Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2006). Incorporation also requires additional legal fees
and paperwork to comply with corporate law, implying a higher cost of administration
and operation. Finally, when it comes to dissolving or closing down the incorporated
business, the rm needs to follow a procedure that is far more complicated than that
for other forms of business. In summary, apart from the e¤ect of income taxes on
business organizational form, a wide range of non-tax factors play a role in shaping
the decision to incorporate.
4 Income tax in the early twentieth century
In this section I explain some essential features of the federal and state income taxa-
tion in the early twentieth century. The rich time-series and cross-state variation in
the tax variables provide excellent sources for identication in the empirical estima-
tion.
4.1 Federal income taxes
The federal corporate income tax was established by the Tari¤ Act of 1909. It was
rst formatted as a special tax on the privilege of conducting business as a corporation
and taxed the net income of corporations over $5,000 at one percent.6 The validity of
corporate income tax was a¢ rmed by the Supreme Court in 1911. Shortly after the
ratication of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Revenue Act of 1913 introduced federal
personal income tax. The following decade was a period of major and frequent changes
in income tax legislations. Table B2 and B3 list all the acts that a¤ected corporate
and personal income taxes, respectively, during 1909-1919, . Each table describes the
tax rate and schedule in some detail.
Figure 1 plots the time-series of the top statutory corporate tax rate, top personal
tax rate, and marginal personal rates at incomes of $20; 000 and $10; 000 during 1909-
1919. The left vertical axis represents the scale of top statutory corporate rate and
marginal personal rates at incomes of $20; 000 and $10; 000, and the right vertical
axis represents the top personal rate at a larger scale. Over time, there is an evident
upward trend in the corporate tax rates, with the corporate and individual income
tax rates starting to diverge from 1916. However, two major changes in the taxa-
tion of corporate income are not reected in Figure 1. First, the Revenue Act of
1917 introduced the war prots tax and excess prots tax, both targeted at income
6The Payne-Aldrich Tari¤ Act, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
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of corporations.7 Though temporary in nature, these war taxes demonstrated some
clear disincentives on corporate activities. For example, the number of manufactur-
ing corporations reporting to the Bureau of Internal Revenue was signicantly lower
in 1918-19 compared with 1916-17, reecting a disincorporation movement to avoid
the excess-prots tax (Schmidt and Young, 1943).8 Second, unlimited deduction for
corporate interest payments was introduced in 1918 as a temporary measure to com-
pensate for the e¤ects of the excess prots tax.9 But when the excess prots tax was
repealed in 1921, the full interest deduction remained as part of the corporate income
tax without any formal justication from Congress.10
Movement of the three personal tax series in Figure 1 suggests that statutory
personal income tax experienced frequent and signicant increases during this period.
Two components of the personal tax rate a at normal tax for all income above
exemption and a progressive surtax ranging from 2 to 73 percentboth contributed
to the increasing spread between the corporate and personal tax rates.
Another key feature of personal income tax in this period is that it is extremely
progressive at the federal level. Between 1913 and 1919, the number of income tax
brackets increased from 7 to 56, and the top marginal rate increased from 7 to 73
percent. Dividend income was exempted from normal personal tax but not from the
surtax.11Theoretically, this treatment was intended to shield corporate income from
double taxation. Income from realized capital gains, on the other hand, were taxed
at the same rate as regular personal income.12
4.2 State income taxes
The passage of a permanent federal income encouraged the enactment of income taxes
at the state level. Wisconsin passed the rst modern state income tax law in 1911
and many other states followed in the next few years.13 Tables B4 and B5 list all the
state income laws that were enacted between 1911 and 1919. Five states had imposed
7The war prots tax was eliminated in January 1919, and the excess-prots tax remained in place
until 1921.
8Schmidt and Young (1943) mainly considered the e¤ect of World War I on business nancing
but also noted that excess prots taxes might have decreased the number of manufacutring and
trade corporations between 1914 and 1920.
9Before then, only limited o¤sets against corporate income could be applied for interest payments.
10For a discussion of the historical impact of the corporate interest deduction, see Warren (1974).
11Specically, retained earnings were not subject to the progressive surtax until distributed as a
dividend. The dividiend exemption remained in e¤ect until the Revenue Act of 1936 mandated that
corporate dividends paid to individuals should be taxed as ordinary personal income.
12Until the Revenue Act of 1921 introduced a preferred capital gains rate of 12.5% (Auten, 1999).
13Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, ch. 658.
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income taxes by 1913; by 1919, 14 states had either corporate, or personal, or both
income taxes in place. The general scope of income taxes follows:
 Combined personal and corporation income tax laws: Alabama (1919), Mis-
sissippi(1912), Missouri(1917), New Mexico(1919), North Dakota(1919), Vir-
ginia(1916), Wisconsin(1911).
 Personal income tax laws and distinct corporate income tax laws: Massa-
chusetts(1917), New York(1917).
 Personal income tax laws, but no corporation income tax laws: Delaware(1917),
Oklahoma(1913).
 Corporations taxed on income basis, but no personal income tax: Connecti-
cut(1915), Montana(1917) and West Virginia(1915).
In principle, each state allocated the corporation income tax for both domestic
and foreign corporations. Specic measures of income allocation and apportionment,
on the other hand, varied across states. Five states (Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Virginia, and Wisconsin) allowed taxation of corporate income on separate account-
ing, a measure that assures the most accurate income basis for corporations that
can make a separate accounting. Other states used formulary apportionment based
on property, cost of production, and gross sales, with gross sales the most common
measure for income allocation.
Figure 2 illustrates the relative taxation of corporate income at state level in 1919
by plotting corporate tax rate against personal tax rate. Six states are above the
45 degree line, taxing corporate income relatively heavily in comparison with their
taxation of personal income. Delaware and North Dakota, on the other hand, are
below the 45 degree line and tax corporate income comparatively lightly. The rest
of the states locate on the 45 degree line, taxing corporate and personal income at
the same rate. Within each state, there were frequent tax legislation changes related
to the exemption threshold and marginal tax rates. The substantial variation in
state tax codes provides this study with ample exogenous variation for identifying
the incentive e¤ect of income taxes.14
14In fact, variation in state rates can be extreme in the cross-section since 34 states did not impose
a tax on income during the sample period. Lutz (1920), Bigham (1929), and Blakey and Johnson
(1941) discuss the progress of the state income taxation since 1911. Rising property tax rates in the
1920s, signicant property tax delinquencies in the 1930s, and further e¤orts to reach intangibles
prompted further adoptions of income taxes. 33 states had an individual and/or corporate income
tax by 1940 (Blakey and Blakey, 1940, p. 131).
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5 Data and descriptive analysis
5.1 Degree of incorporation
The quinquennial Census of Manufacturers provides state-level data on the legal
organizational form of manufacturing enterprises for 1904, 1909, 1914, and 1919.15 It
categorizes an establishment into one of the following three forms:
 Individual ownership with no limit to personal liability.
 Corporations with limited liability.
 All other forms including establishments operated by rms, cooperative associ-
ations, and miscellaneous forms of ownership that are not subject to corporate
income tax.16
For each organizational form, aggregate information is available for the number
of active establishments, the number of wage earners, the value of production, and
value-added by manufacturing. The fact that ownership is counted by establishment
o¤ers a key advantage for my analysis. Unlike rms that may have several plants
in di¤erent states, an establishment is located in the state of actual taxation, since
location of the plant is closely tied to the common measures of income allocation such
as property and sales.17 As a result, the tax variables are free of measurement noise
that may arise from taking the weighted average of tax rates for multi-state rms.18
15The Census of Manufacturers classies data by establishment which is dened as follows: As
a rule, the term establishmentssignies a single plant or factory. However, in some cases, it refers
to two or more plants operated under a common ownership and located in the same city, or in the
same county but in di¤erent municipalities or in unincorporated places having fewer than 10,000
inhabitants. On the other hand, separate reports are occasionally obtained for di¤erent lines of
manufacturing carried on in the same plant, in which event a single plant is counted as two or more
establishments. In every industry, however, the di¤erence between the number of establishments
and the actual number of plants or factories is negligible (Census of Manufacturers, 1919, p.5).
The Census excluded establishments with an annual product value of $500 or less.
16Census of Manufacturers, 1919, pp. 340.
17For example, Wisconsin attributed the following two classes of sales as in-state income: (1)
goods manufactured within the state, sold to customers outside the state, and delivered from the
factory within the state; and (2) goods manufactured within the state, shipped to branches outside
the state, sold to customers outside the state, and delivered to these customers from the branches
outside the state.
18Unfortunately, after 1921 questions about the ownership status by establishment are removed
from the Census schedule, and the data in our study is the most extensive public record of ownership
characteristics at the state level.
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To compute the corporate share of various economic activities, I divide establish-
ments operated by corporations by the sum of establishments in all forms and derive
three indicators for the share of corporate activities in the economy as follows:
 The corporate share in the total number of establishments.
 The corporate share in employment measured by the number of wage earners.
 The corporate share in the value of new products.
By 1919, the manufacturing sector had 21.9 percent of total corporations in the
U.S. and produced more than 50 percent of corporate income. Within the manufac-
turing sector, corporations played an important role as measured by their share of
economic activities. But manufacturing is by no means the only sector dominated by
corporations. Using the 1919 Statistics of Income (SOI) tax return data on the dis-
tribution of corporate and individual income, I compute the percentage of corporate
returns and gross income by industrial groups. As illustrated in Figure 3, corpora-
tions are equally important in trade, nance, banking and insurance, and mining and
quarry sectors.
5.2 Tax variables
To compute the tax cost of incorporation, I rst calculate a combined income tax rate
as the sum of the federal and the e¤ective state tax rate, where the e¤ective state
rate reects the deductibility of federal income taxes at the state level. Consequently,
the state-specic tax cost to incorporate (Tc) is
Tc = tc + (1  tc)te   tp,
with tc the combined corporate tax rate, tp the combined personal tax rate, and te
the tax rate on equity income.
Data on federal income tax rates are collected from the U.S. Federal Individual
and Corporate Income Tax Rates History tables published by the Tax Foundation.19
Data on state income tax rates are determined from state income tax legislations of
various years. The marginal corporate tax rate is computed as the sum of the normal
federal income tax rate, the average excess-prots tax rate, and the top statutory
state rate. An average excess-prots tax rate measure is calculated using the SOI tax
19http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/151.html
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return data.20 Specically, an average 1919 rate is computed by taking the ratio of
the excess-prots tax paid by corporations to the sum of net income and excess-prots
tax. The average excess-prots tax rate was 15:21% in 1919.
Some assumptions are required to measure the marginal personal tax rate. Unlike
analysis that uses the maximum personal rate for contemporary data, I cannot rely
on changes in the top marginal rate since the top bracket was extremely progressive
in this period. In 1919, for example, only 65 lers were subjected to the 73 percent
top marginal rate. Instead, I use the marginal tax rate for lers with a net income
of $20,000. This threshold is the lowest income bracket above which the surtax rates
apply. In 1914, the rst year that personal returns were collected, individuals with an
annual income of $20,000 and above were at approximately the top 9 percent of income
distribution and received more than 80 percent of dividend payouts.21 For robustness,
personal tax rates at $10,000 and $30,000 income levels are also considered. As
discussed in the previous section, dividend income was exempt from normal personal
income tax but not from surtax. I calculate the dividend tax rates in each case
accordingly and include it as part of the tax burden for shareholders. Because capital
gains are taxed upon realization, I assume a zero tax rate on capital gains in the basic
specication. Estimation results using a weighted average of dividend and capital
gains tax are very similar and hence not reported.
5.3 Control variables
A few variables are included to capture the non-tax reasons to incorporate. I use the
size of the manufacturing sector as an indicator for the infrastructure and development
of industrial policy. Well-developed infrastructure and industrial policies may enable
rms to generate agglomeration rents, implying somewhat easier access to external
nance. The size of the industrial sector is measured by the percentage of employment
in manufacturing relative to that in agriculture and mining. This information is
available in the WorkersCompensation Data Set compiled by Fishback and Kantor
(2000).
Secondly, I control for the average size of establishment to account for the fact that
rms tend to incorporate as they grow larger and become more complex. This size
e¤ect is recognized by Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) and empirically tested by Gordon
20For instance, the excess prots tax were assessed as 20 percent of net income above the excess-
prots credits, which is a xed $3,000 plus 8 percent of invested capital in the current year.
21For comparison, one needs a household income of $100; 000 or above to be at the same percentile
of the income distribution in 2007.
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and MacKie-Mason (1994). The size of the average establishment in manufacturing is
measured by the average number of workers per establishment. In addition, the aver-
age capital intensity in manufacturing is included as a proxy for demand for external
funds, which is considered more important for corporations (Egger, Keuschnigg and
Winner, 2009). The capital intensity variable is computed as the ratio of the capital
input to the sum of capital input and wage and salary payment, with data on factor
inputs taken from the Census of Manufacturers in relevant years.
If rms relocate to a neighboring state with attractive tax policies, di¤erences
in the business market conditions across states need to be controlled for. Following
Feld and Kirchgassner (2003) and Goolsbee (2004), I compute measures of di¤erence
in the own-state and neighboring-state demographic variables including the share of
foreign born population, the share of the state population that is illiterate, the share
of black/urban population. Data on these variables are available in Fishback and
Kantor (2000). Denitions of control variables are summarized in Table B1.
5.4 Summary statistics and descriptive analysis
The nal dataset covers 48 continental states and has 196 state-year observations,
with summary statistics of all variables summarized in Table 1. As noted above,
the economic importance of corporations is indicated by their portion of employment
(78.92%) and value of production (81.5%) rather than the share of establishment
(28.40%). On average, the e¤ective corporate tax rate is 7 percent in the analysis
sample, the average e¤ective personal rate is 4.92 percent, and the dividend tax rate
is 2.79 percent. Accounting for the double taxation of corporate income, one dollar
was taxed about ve cents more if it was earned in the form of corporate income
rather than personal income during the sample period.
Figure 4 o¤ers descriptive evidence that the tax cost to incorporate discourages
corporate activities. The gure groups the corporate share of economic activities by
the tax cost to incorporate in di¤erent states and considers changes in the average
number of establishments, employment, and value of production between 1904 and
1919, all relative to the 1904 levels. Each bar indicates average sample values. The
gure illustrates that increases in the relative importance of corporate activities are
greater in low-tax states than in high-tax states. There is a clear association between
a lower tax cost to incorporate and larger increases of corporate activities.
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6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Econometric model
The empirical specication is derived by taking log on both sides of equation (3):
log(1 +Gic) > log(1   ip)  log(1   ic    ie +  ic ie):
Since log(1 + t) ' t, a rm will incorporate in state i if
Gic > 
i
c + (1   ic) ie    ip: (4)
The di¤erential term,  c + (1    c) e    p; in equation (4) summarizes the relative
taxation of corporate to non-corporate income, namely, the tax cost to incorporate.
At the rm level, a lower tax cost to incorporate is associated with a higher probability
to incorporate. At the state level, the fraction of corporations is modeled as a function
of the tax cost to incorporate Tc and personal tax rate Tp. The basic specication of
interest is
lnSit = t + 1Tc;it + 2Tp;it + Zit+i + "it; (5)
where Sit is the corporate share of rms in state i in year t, and Zit is a vector of non-
tax factors that may inuence the incorporation decision. The variable t is a time
e¤ect that is modelled as year dummies, which captures the potential impact of pro-
gressive movement and macroeconomic shocks on corporate activities. The turn of the
twentieth century was a time of tremendous change in social reform, government reg-
ulation and technological advancement in transportation and communication. Such
time-specic macroeconomic shocks could obscure the incentive e¤ects of changes in
marginal rates if time dummies were not included (Romer and Romer, 2011). The
state dummies (the 0is) represent the unobserved factors that vary across states but
can reasonably be thought to be constant during the sample period (e.g. legal and
regulatory environment).
6.2 Within-group regressions
Table 2 presents regression results from estimating Eq. (5) with standard errors ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form. There is a strong relationship between
business incorporation and income taxes. A larger di¤erence between corporate and
personal tax rates reduces the fraction of economic activities undertaken by corpora-
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tions, presenting evidence that rms shift from corporate to non-corporate status in
response to a higher tax cost to incorporate. For a given tax cost to incorporate, a
higher personal tax rate raises incorporation rates. The signicance of the two tax
variables is robust to inclusion of state-level covariates.
Taken at face value, for every unit decrease in the tax cost to incorporate, the
corporate share of establishment increases by 1.84 percent. Given that the mean es-
tablishment share is around 28.4 percent during this period, this increase corresponds
to a 0.52 percentage point increase in the corporate share of establishment. Similarly,
a 1 percentage point decrease in the tax cost to incorporate increases the corporate
share of employment by 1.11 percentage points and the corporate share of production
by 1.00 percentage point. Firms that incorporate in response to tax incentives have
a higher share of employment and production relative to the share of establishment.
The operation scale of the new corporations is larger than the average rm in the
economy but slightly smaller compared with their existing counterparts.
Measures of the non-tax factors have the expected sign but are often estimated
with imprecision. The presence of a large manufacturing sector encourages corporate
hiring but has negligible e¤ect on incorporation rates or corporate output. A higher
capital intensity is associated with a larger scale of corporate production, consistent
with the hypothesis that rms with high investment and growth demand benet more
from incorporation. The establishment size coe¢ cient is positive and signicant in all
three equations, consistent with the empirical regularity that large companies tend
to incorporate for better monitoring and governance mechanism.
6.3 Addressing the endogeneity of taxation
An important issue for the estimation of the causal impacts of tax rates on incor-
poration is the exogeneity of changes in income tax rates. Any observed correlation
between tax rate and tax base can be driven by reverse causation; that is, when states
enact an income tax, or change the tax rate, in response to a relatively expanding
tax base. Positive feedback of this form tends to biase the OLS estimates of the
tax e¤ects toward zero. To identify the causal e¤ect of income taxes on incorpora-
tion, I exploit exogenous changes in tax rates that are unlikely to be correlated with
contemporaneous changes in the corporate tax base.
At the turn of the twentieth century, general property taxes were not as e¤ective
at tapping new forms of wealth. In response, state legislators started to consider
17
alternative tax measures such as franchise and income taxes.22 One of the clearest
statements of this motivation comes from the 1907Wisconsin State Tax Commission
Annual Report , which stated:
The very ine¢ cient manner in which the personal property tax has been
assessed and the resulting gross inequalities in taxation, as well as the agi-
tation of the subject of credit exemption, have brought about the pending
constitutional amendment authorizing a graduated income tax (p. 30).
Intuitively, the revenue-raising capacity of general property tax is directly linked with
a states propensity to increase income taxes. Alternatively, the per-capita property
tax bill may reect the states long-run revenue need. Relying on these insights, I use
one-year lagged per-capita property tax as an instrument for the income tax variables.
Annual data on property tax are collected from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, from across various years.
The scal conditions of the state can also shed light on the legislative motivation
for taxing income. Romer and Romer (2011) points out that most federal income
tax changes during the inter-war period were tied to spending changes. Conceivably,
states with budget decits should also be more likely to raise income tax rates to
fund spending. Following this argument, I construct a decit dummy variable equal
to one for states with current-year expenditure exceeding revenue and equal to zero
for those states with current-year expenditure below revenue. Data on state revenue
and expenditure are collected from Sources and Uses of Funds in State and Local
Government in the United States, 1790-1915 (ICPSR9728). In contrast with per-
capita property tax revenue, the decit dummies are most likely to capture the revenue
needs of a state over the short term.
Between 1880 and 1907, agricultural and industrial states developed distinctive
approaches to taxing corporations. While urban and industrial states taxed corpora-
tions to fund increased public spending, agricultural states in the South and Great
Plains spent far less on schools, asylums, and other public improvements and did not
initiate signicant corporation taxes (Pegram, 2004). Such di¤erences reected the
fundamental di¤erence in their political ideologies between the north and south. To
capture the impact of political ideology in shaping income tax policies, I use the share
of employment in agriculture to measure the strength of agricultural interest in each
22Property taxes remained as the most important source of state and local nance. By 1902,
property taxes accounted for 57 percent of all state revenues and 73 percent of all revenues raised
at the local level(Wallis, 2000).
18
state.23
In this framework, it is important that the proposed instruments are valid in the
sense that: they i) signicantly explain part of the variation in both the corporate and
individual income tax rates, and ii) are uncorrelated with the unobserved determi-
nants of incorporation rates. The rst issue is a statistical one that, as shown below,
is satised since each individual instrument is a strong predictor of the tax variables
while jointly the instruments are signicant as indicated by the F statistic. Regarding
the second issue, it is unlikely that any of these instruments are critical determinants
of the decision to incorporate by individual rms. Companies in a decit state might
well anticipate the passage of new tax measures, but there is no clear evidence that
rms would expect the passage of income taxes in particular.24
The proposed instruments directly address the potential endogeneity of the tax
rate levels. I am less concerned about the endogeneity of the di¤erences between the
corporate and personal tax rate. At the state level, such di¤erences tend to arise from
the deductibility of federal income tax at the state level, which is exogenous from the
states perspective. To illustrate, suppose that in a given state corporate and personal
income are taxed at the same at rate ts, accounting for the deductibility of federal
income tax, the e¤ective state corporate and personal rate is (1  tfc )ts and (1  tfp)ts,
respectively. The di¤erence in the e¤ective tax rates (tfp   tfc )ts is a by-product of
the di¤erence in the federal tax rates augmented by the level of income tax across
di¤erent states.
6.4 Instrumented regressions and the additional role of per-
sonal income tax
Table 3 presents the IV regressions with state-year xed e¤ects. Columns (1)-(2)
present the rst-stage results using the instruments described above. The strength of
23The party of the governor is a possible alternative instrument for this purpose: but this variable
has limited variation within a state during this period and is weakly correlated with the respective
states income tax rates.
24Take the state of Missouri for example: It continued with a policy of decit spending during
the rst two decades of the twentieth century and considered various new sources of revenue to cope
with its poor nancial condition. However, between 1905 and 1909, no signicant tax legislation or
reform occurred. In 1909, Governor Hadley asked the legislature to enact four major tax meausures
including a tax on capital stock of corporations, increased inheritance taxes, an oil inspection tax
and a tax on the inspection of spirits or linquors. The legislature acted only on the oil inspection
tax. Income taxes were not in place until 1917, when the legislature approved six out of a package of
nine major tax proposals including the corporation franchise tax, an individual tax, the rst income
tax, a general and revised inheritance tax, a secured debt tax, a soft drink inspection tax, and a
wholesale liquor dealers tax.
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the rst stage is indicated by the relevant coe¢ cients and the F statistics. The e¤ects
of the instruments on the income tax rates are consistent with previous discussions.
The p-value of Hansens J statistic in each specication exceeds the conventional
signicance level, suggesting that the instruments are exogenous with respect to the
income tax rates.25
Columns (3)-(6) present the IV estimates. The signs of the tax coe¢ cients remain
unchanged. The IV estimates of the tax coe¢ cients are signicantly larger than those
obtained using ordinary least squares, consistent with reverse causality biasing the
OLS estimates toward zero. A 1 percentage point increase in the tax cost to incor-
porate decreases the corporate share of establishment by 3.89 percent, employment
by 2.27 percent, and value of production by 1.93 percent. Computed with the mean
shares of corporate activities, these estimates translate to an elasticity of establish-
ment share of 1.10, employment share of 1.79, and production share of 1.57. The
magnitude of these estimates is comparable to the largest existing estimates of re-
sponsiveness in Goolsbee (2004), although that study focuses on a much more mobile
sector and uses more recent and condential data.
When taxing non-corporate income at a di¤erent rate than corporate income,
personal income tax a¤ects the choice of organizational form by changing the expected
after-tax net income. If this is the only channel through which personal income
tax can a¤ect incorporation, its impact should be fully captured in the tax cost
term. However, this is not what we observe from the estimation results. The fact
that personal tax coe¢ cient remains signicant when controlling for the tax cost
term suggests that the personal tax rates may inuence the choice of organizational
form through other channels. For example, a positive personal tax coe¢ cient is
consistent with the existence of tax evasion. To the extent that individual income
tax is much easier to evade than the corporate tax, unincorporated rms are more
likely to underreport their activities when facing a higher personal tax rate. They
may stop ling tax returns and other related government surveys, disappearing all
together from the sample data. If this is the case, the higher share of corporation
could be a mere artifact of fewer reported unincorporated rms in the state.
The combination of progressive personal income tax rates and at corporate tax
rates encouraged substitution of non-corporate forms with corporations, a hypothesis
theoretically formalized in Cullen and Gordon (2007) and empirically tested in Gen-
25A reduced-form regression of the instruments on incorporation variables suggests the agricultural
interest variable to be a relatively weak instrument. I run a separate set of IV regressions with two
instruments: in this case, the tax coe¢ cients are exactly identied. The quantitative e¤ect of the
tax coe¢ cient remains quite similar.
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try and Hubbard (2005). When facing a progressive tax schedule, rms would require
a higher pretax expected return on more risky projects to o¤set a higher expected
tax payment. In this case, the positive personal tax coe¢ cient captures the impact
of personal tax progressivity on incorporation. To test this hypothesis, I replace the
e¤ective personal tax rate with a measure of personal tax progressivity, a variable de-
ned as the di¤erence between the marginal tax rates at $20,000 and the marginal rate
at income level the 25th percentile of income distribution. The regression results are
summarized in Table 4. As expected, the tax progressivity coe¢ cient is positive and
highly signicant. However, when the regression includes both the personal tax rate
and tax progressivity measure, neither estimate is signicant due to multicollinearity.
Last but not least, a non-corporate rm can move to a neighboring state and
stay unincorporated when facing a higher personal tax rate in its current state of
residence. Therefore the personal tax variable may also capture the potential tax
savings for rms moving to a lower-taxed jurisdiction. I modify the theory model to
incorporate tax-induced relocation and the full derivation is included in the Appen-
dix. Allowing for the possiblity that rms may relocate across di¤erent states, the
decision to incorporate now depends on the own-state tax cost to incorporate, the
own-state personal tax rate, and the personal tax rate in the neighboring states. The
estimation equation is modied by including the di¤erence between the own-state and
average neighboring-state personal tax rate, controlling for average di¤erences in a
few demographic characteristics across states. The regression results are summarized
in Table 5. Interestingly, while the tax cost term remains signicant, neither personal
tax rate turns out to be statistically signicant. The small value of the F statistic,
however, suggests that struments for the average personal tax rates are quite weak.
A more intuitive explanation for the insignicant coe¢ cients, is that these tax di¤er-
ences are very likely to be temporary in the growing wave of new state income tax
legislations. Consequently, tax savings associated with relocating to a low-tax state
are very likely to be transient and miniscule compared to the cost of relocation.
7 Robustness and further discussion
Table 6 provides some evidence for the robustness of the ndings. As the agricul-
ture interest variable seems to be a weak IV, I repeat the IV regression with two
instruments. In this case the IV estimates are exactly identied. The results are
summarized in panel A and are very similar to the main results shown in Table 3.
Regression in panel B recognizes that in a panel setting the tax incentives are re-
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stricted to have the same e¤ect across all states. It is possible that rms are less
sensitive to tax incentives in rural and less industrial states. To see if the results are
mainly driven by incorporation in the urban and industrial states, I generate man-
ufacturing importance weighted (MIW) estimates and place more weight on those
states with a large manufacturing sector. Specically, each observation is weighted
by the share of employment in manufacturing. The MIW results are given in panel
B. The tax coe¢ cients remain very similar to the main IV results.
In panel C and D I use alternative personal tax rates at incomes of $30,000 and
$10,000. While the pattern of the results remains qualitatively the same, tax rates
have a smaller e¤ect at the lower income bracket. This is consistent when the net
advantage faced by a potential entrepreneur in a high personal tax bracket is larger.
When personal tax rates are more dispersed, those in the highest tax brackets face
stronger tax incentives to become entrepreneurs while those in the lowest tax brackets
face stronger tax disincentives (Gordon, 1998). As a result, during such a period,
entrepreneurs are more likely to be drawn from the top tax brackets.
8 Conclusion
Understanding the importance of taxes in inuencing rmsincorporation and loca-
tion decisions is very important for public policy. Study of the early period of income
taxation o¤ers some unique advantages for the purpose of such analysis. Both cor-
porate and personal income taxes were introduced at the federal level in this period.
Many states enacted the income tax legislations for the rst time. Changes in mar-
ginal tax rates were large, frequent and heterogeneous across states. This period is
also a relatively clean setting to study the impact of taxes on income shifting through
incorporation. The organizational form data are free of measurement errors caused
by hybrid entities such as limited liability partnerships. The analysis is also less likely
to su¤er from omitted variable bias that may arise from various state anti-avoidance
regulations that have been implemented at a much later stage.
The results show that the relative taxation of corporate to personal income plays
an important role in the share of corporate establishments, employment and produc-
tion, while personal income tax can a¤ect the choice of organizational form through
additional channels. Firms that have responded to the incorporation incentives of-
fered by the tax system are larger than the average rm in the economy. The incentive
e¤ects of the corporate and personal income taxes are precisely estimated and their
robustness to the potential reverse causality between the tax rates and income tax
22
base has been demonstrated.
The obvious disadvantage of using the early period of income taxation, as also
pointed out by Romer and Romer (2011), is that the economic environment was very
di¤erent from that of today. Since that time, rms have become much more mobile,
and hybrid business entities such as the S corporation have proliferated in the U.S. To
this end, the tax-cost elasticity estimates presented in this study can be interpreted
as upper bounds on rms responsiveness of the choice of organizational form to
tax incentives in todays economy. Just as U.S. states compete with each other in
generating income tax revenues in the early twentieth century, countries at present
compete in the global capital market by setting their corporate tax rates strategically.
Therefore, analysis based on historical data can still help us to understand the role
of taxes in the allocation of capital across organizational forms and locations in the
current economic environment.
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Figure 1: Marginal Federal Income Tax Rate, 1909-1919
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Figure 2: State Income Tax Rates in 1919
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Figure 3: Distribution of Corporations by Industrial Group in 1919
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Figure 4: Corporate Activities and State Income Taxes
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Note: This gure displays percentage changes in the mean corporate share
of economic activities for high and low levels of tax cost to incorporate. Per-
centage change in the corporate share of economic activities is the ratio of
the di¤erence between 1919 and 1904 value to the 1904 value. Tax cost to in-
corporate is dened as High/Low if the corporate income tax is above/below
the personal income tax at the state level.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Corporate Share of Establishment 196 0.284 0.063 0.160 0.507
Corporate Share of Employment 196 0.789 0.102 0.452 0.943
Corporate Share of Production 196 0.815 0.098 0.459 0.966
Tax Cost to Incorporate 196 0.049 0.078 0.000 0.204
E¤ective Corporate Income Tax 196 0.070 0.109 0.000 0.297
E¤ective Personal Income Tax 196 0.049 0.074 0.000 0.220
E¤ective Dividend Tax 196 0.028 0.042 0.000 0.130
Size of Manufacturing Sector 192 1.430 2.540 0.077 16.659
Avg. Establishment Size 196 23.155 12.630 3.462 60.184
Capital Intensity 196 4.145 1.054 1.788 10.295
Note: Please refer to Table B1 for a complete list of variable denitions.
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Table 5: Incorporation vs. Relocation: Second-Stage Results
Dependent variable (in log of shares): Establishment Employment Production
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Cost to Incorporate -3.1725*** -2.7462*** -2.2192**
(1.2280) (0.8885) (0.9009)
Personal Tax Rate -1.4791 5.4325 4.1032
(6.2823) (3.3096) (3.4240)
Average Personal Tax Rate: 5.4142 -2.0290 -1.1981
Neighboring States (5.8646) (2.8712) (2.9852)
Size of Manufacturing Sector 0.0199 0.0092 0.0011
(0.0184) (0.0073) (0.0096)
Average Establishment Size 0.3057*** 0.1211*** 0.1137***
(0.0606) (0.0397) (0.0413)
Capital Intensity -0.0008 0.0076 0.0171**
(0.0119) (0.0064) (0.0067)
Di¤erence in State Characteristics:
Illiteracy Rate -0.0147 0.0061 0.0035
(0.0193) (0.0073) (0.0075)
Population 0.0112* 0.0022 -0.0023
(0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0034)
% of Immigrants -0.0334 -0.0089 -0.0048
(0.0280) (0.0153) (0.0158)
% of Black Population -0.0200 -0.0228* -0.0168**
(0.0144) (0.0119) (0.0085)
% of Urban Population 0.0054 0.0071* 0.0043
(0.0060) (0.0038) (0.0037)
State/Year xed e¤ects? Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.483 0.498 0.474
Hansen J statistics p value 0.9882 0.2599 0.2739
Weak identication statistic 1.1904 1.1904 1.1904
Note: N=192. A constant is included in the regression. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable (in log of shares): Establishment Employment Production
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Exact identication
Tax Cost to Incorporate -4.3800*** -1.6882* -1.4218*
(1.5618) (0.9080) (0.8495)
Personal Tax Rate 5.2728*** 2.3659*** 2.1224**
(1.6035) (0.9021) (0.8559)
Panel B: MIW
Tax Cost to Incorporate -3.8769** -1.5887* -1.4496*
(1.6294) (0.9323) (0.8600)
Personal Tax Rate 4.8916*** 2.3034** 2.1263**
(1.6831) (0.9339) (0.8730)
Panel C: $30,000 Income Bracket
Tax Cost to Incorporate -5.6712*** -2.2572* -1.9193*
(2.0134) (1.1575) (1.0822)
Personal Tax Rate 4.8146*** 2.1724*** 1.9368**
(1.4978) (0.8364) (0.7908)
Panel D: $10,000 Income Bracket
Tax Cost to Incorporate -2.9739*** -1.0816* -0.8670
(1.0951) (0.6427) (0.5959)
Personal Tax Rate 5.7123*** 2.5787*** 2.2734**
(1.6906) (0.9501) (0.8936)
State/Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes
37
Note: N=192. All regressions include a constant. Covariates included
but not shown in this table are the size of manufacturing sector, average
establishment size in manufacturing, and average capital-labor ratio in
manufacturing. Instruments included in panel A but not shown are one-
year lagged property tax per capita and decit dummies, and percentage
of employment in agriculture. Instruments included in panel B and C are
one-year lagged property tax per capita, decit dummies, and percentage
of employment in agriculture. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
38
Appendix
A Theoretical Framework: Incorporation vs. Re-
location
In this section I modify the theoretical model to illustrate how rms make decisions
about whether to incorporate and where to locate by comparing after-tax prots from
each combination of organizational form and location. Taxation of rms now di¤ers
by organizational form and location. An entrepreneur organizing a non-corporate
rm in state i earns gross income I igross;p and is taxed at the ordinary personal income
rate  ip. The entrepreneur can also organize as a corporation with gross income I
i
gorss;c
taxed both at the rm and person level, and the after-tax net income is
I ic = (1   ic)(1   ie)I igross;c;
where  ic is the corporate tax rate in state i, and 
i
e is the tax rate on equity income.
Given an increase in  ip, a rm can choose to (i) stay unincorporated in its current
state; (ii) incorporate in its current state; or (iii) stay unincorporated but move to a
di¤erent state j. If the rm moves to state j and stays unincorporated, the associated
non-corporate income Ijgross;p is taxed at 
j
p, the personal tax rate in state j:
Ijp = (1   jp)Ijgross;p:
From the usual assumption that rms maximize their prots subject to certain
constraints, each rm chooses its organizational form and location if prots are highest
such that I = max
 
I ip; I
i
c; I
j
p

: In particular, a rm will incorporate in state i if I ic
yields the maximum prots. Specically, the following two conditions need to be
satised. First, the net corporate prot is higher than the net non-corporate prot
in state i,
(1   ic)(1   ie)I igross;c > (1   ip)I igross;p; (A1)
and second, the net corporate prot is higher than any potential non-corporate income
in state j:
(1   ic)(1   ie)I igross;c > (1   jp)Ijgross;p: (A2)
We approximate that I igross;c is proportional to I
i
gross;p by (1 +G
i
c):
Ic = (1 +Gc)Inc: (A3)
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where Gic again represents the non-tax cost and benet associated with incorporation
in state i. Similarly, we approximate I igross;p to be proportional to I
i
gross;p by (1+G
j
p) :
Ijgross;p =
(1 +Gjp)
(1  s) I
i
gross;p; (A4)
where Gjp captures the non-tax reasons to have an unincorporated business in state
j relative to state i such as favorable market or regulation conditions. Combining
equations (A1)-(A4), a rm will choose to incorporate in its current state if
(1 +Gic) >
(1   ip)
(1   ic)(1   ie)
; (A5)
and
(1 +Gic)
(1 +Gjp)
>
(1   jp)
(1   ic)(1   ie)
: (A6)
Taking log on both sides of equation (A5) and (A6) yields
log(1 +Gic) > log(1   ip)  log(1   ic    ie +  ic ie);
and
log(1 +Gic)  log(1 +Gjp) > log(1   jp)  log(1   ic    ie +  ic ie):
Since log(1 + t) ' t, a rm will incorporate in its current state i if
Gic > 
i
c + (1   ic) ie    ip; (A7)
and
Gic  Gjp >  ic + (1   ic) ie    jp: (A8)
The di¤erential term,  c + (1   c) e    p; in equation (A7) summarizes the relative
taxation of corporate to non-corporate income, i.e., the tax cost to incorporate. Fur-
ther, the likelihood that a rm will incorporate in its current state decreases with the
personal tax rate of neighboring states.
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